THE FIRST STAGE OF THE 

MOVEMENT FOR THE ANNEX 

ATI ON OF TEXAS 



GEORGE P. GARRISON 



REPRINTED FROM THE 



gimetmtt |ii^twal ^mnv 



Vol. X No. 



OCTOBER, i()04 



THE FIRST STAGE OF THE 

MOVEMENT FOR THE ANNEX 

ATION OF TEXAS 



BY 



GEORGE P. GARRISON 



REPRINTED FROM THE 



gimcriati |ifet(inal §txUw 



Vol. X NO. I 



OCTOBER, 1904 




Glass. 
Book. 



[Reprinted from The American Historical Review, Vol. X., No. i, Oct., 1904.] 



THE FIRST STAGE OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE 
ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 

It is but a truism that the greatest value of history lies in the 
lesson, intellectual and moral, to be learned therefrom ; and in all 
history there is perhaps no movement which is more profoundly in- 
structive in both these aspects than the annexation of Texas. No 
clash of opposing political and social forces, no melee of antagonistic 
human impulses, within the record has given better opportunity to 
distinguish the wisdom of the ages from the imperious conviction of 
the moment. But it is unsafe to consider any historical question 
primarily from the didactic standpoint. In such case, as experience 
has shown, insight is too often dulled by belief, and investigation 
misled by prejudice. The first concern, therefore, of every student 
of history should be the fact ; from that alone can the true lesson 
be obtained. In accordance with this principle, I shall give atten- 
tion, within the limits assigned me, mainly to the actual happenings 
of the annexation movement, only now and then touching upon 
their deep significance. 

The subject of this paper is best approached by a brief summary 
of the events which led to the movement under consideration. This 
movement was begun by Texas^ and was, it seems to me, a natural 
result of the Anglo-American occupation of that country and of the 
revolution which separated it from Mexico. 

The Anglo-American influx into Texas began while the western 
boundary of the expanding United States yet rested on the Missis- 
sippi. The Louisiana purchase made this line coterminous on the 
southwest with the northeastern limit of Mexico, but the common 
boundary was not determined till 1819, when, for the sake of Florida, 
whatever claims the United States may have had to Texas were 
definitely given up. The intruders, however, continued to cross the 
Sabine without permission until the eve of the revolution which made 
Mexico independent of Spain. From that time forward the move- 
ment changed its nature and took on a colonizing aspect. The 
Anglo-Americans were allowed to enter freely as immigrants, and 
'inducements to come were ofifered them in the shape of liberal allot- 
ments of land. By 1830 the Mexican government had become un- 
easy concerning the growth of an essentially alien population in 

1 Of course the suggestion is much older than the movement. I have not under- 
taken to trace the beginnings of the idea. 

(72) 



»v » ^. *j^ 4 ;^ . if '> 



J^ G. p. Garrison 

Texas and issued a decree forbidding further immigration from the 
United States. Nevertheless the immigrants continued to come, in 
considerable numbers at least. Finally in 1835 occurred the in- 
evitable clash, which resulted in the expulsion of the Mexicans in 
1836 and the independence of Texas. ^ 

The Texas revolution passed, in its development, through two 
states. In its first phase it was a struggle for the Mexican Consti- 
tution of 1824. in which Texas alone held out against the centralizing 
policy of Santa Anna after a similar resistance on the part of 
Zacatecas and Coahuila had been crushed by force. But after the 
colonists had definitely refused, in November, 1835, to claim inde- 
pendence, and after they had captured Cos's army at San Antonio 
and had cleared their soil of Mexican troops, it became evident that 
there was no hope of cooperation from the Liberals in Mexico, and 
that Texas must either submit or abandon the confederation. These 
alternatives had made themselves clear by January i, 1836, and from 
that time forward the aim of the struggle was for independence. 

Meanwhile a commission consisting of Stephen F. Austin, Wil- 
liam H. Wharton, and Branch T. Archer had been sent to the 
United States to do Texas such service as it could. The principal 
work of the commissioners lay in stirring up public sentiment on 
behalf of the Texans and securing aid for them in men and money ; 
but their letters indicate that they considered themselves instructed 
to negotiate for the recognition of the new republic, and, under cer- 
tain contingencies, also for its annexation to the United States. 

While the commissioners were in New Orleans in January, 1836, 
they prepared a design for a Texas flag, which was peculiarly sug- 
gestive of the importance they attached to the relations connected 
with the idea of annexation. It had — or was meant to have — the 
thirteen stripes of the United States flag, with the red changed to 
blue, and in the upper left-hand corner, instead of the stars, was the 
British union with red stripes on a white field. On the fly was a 
sun encircled by the motto Lux Libcrfatis, and on the face of the 
sun was the head of Washington, underneath which were the words, 
" In his example there is safety ". The whole would undoubtedly 
have taken the first prize for complication at any world's fair ever 
held. The meaning of it is partly explained in Austin's own words : 

'The assertion made by John Quincy Adams in Congress, December 12, 1S37, 
based on statements in Mayo's Political Sketdies of Eight Yea>s in IVashington ( Ailis 
Register, LIII, 266), to the effect that the revokitionizing of Texas was the result of 
a conspiracy planned by Sam Houston, was incorrect. Von Hoist apparently credits the 
story (^Constitutional History of the United States, H, 562), and Schouler definitely 
accepts it ( History of the United States, IV, 251 ) ; but the Texan revolution cannot be 
explained in thrs way. See The Nation for August 13, 1903, 133-134. 

Gift. 

4 Ja 03 ^ 



Movement for the Aimexation of Texas 



74 

" The shape of the English jack indicates the origin of the North 
American people. The stripes indicate the immediate descent of the 
most of the Texans "} It would seem that the design was intended 
especially as an appeal for recognition both by the United States 
and by England, but it was doubtless intended to suggest annexation 
as well. 

Annexation, in fact, appears to have been the irresistible con- 
clusion of the Texan logic from the moment that the colonists deter- 
mined to break away from Mexico. The independence that necessity 
had forced them to assert was not desired for its own sake. It in- 
volved many problems that they were ill prepared to face, and from 
which admission to the United States would be a happy escape. 
Nearly aU of them had been born and reared in that country,^ and 
they were much attached to it and desirous, to the point of eager- 
ness, to renew their citizenship therein. It is evident that they ''did 
not appreciate the difficulties connected with annexation. If' they 
themselves were willing freely to offer the rich gift of Texas to the 
American Union, how could it, in any rational spirit, be declined? 
To them the idea was one not easily comprehended. Even the com- 
missioners did not discover the strength of the anti-Texas feeling in 
the United States. They wrote home from Washington, April 6, 
1836, while Houston was still retreating before the Mexican army,' 
and while the outlook for Texas— though the commissioners did not 
then know it— was darkest, that they thought the United States 
government was ready to recognize Texas and, if it so desired, to 
admit it into the Union on liberal terms. The want, however,' of 
official news from their government and of proper credentials ' for 
themselves prevented them from giving their judgment any test. 

The commissioners already named were replaced in March, 1836. 
by Messrs. George C. Childress and Robert Hamilton ; and these two,' 
in June following, by James Collinsworth and P. W. Grayson.' 
Meanwhile the Mexicans had been utterly defeated and driven from 
Texas, leaving their general, Santa Anna, and several hundred of 
his men prisoners. In September the permanent government of 
Texas was organized by a general election at which the question of 
annexation was submitted to the people, and a practically unanimous 
vote was cast in favor of the measure.'' At this election Sam Hous- 

1 The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, III, 172. The design 
did not commend itself to the Texas authorities ; but their objection, I think it can be 
shown, was not to its significance. 

2 See the address of the General Council of Texas to the Citizens of the United 
States, October 26, 1835. Mies' Register, XLIX, 234-235. 

3 There were 3,277 for, and 91 against it. 



75 G. P. Garj^ison 

ton was chosen president. He appointed Stephen F. Austin secre- 
tary of state, and WilHam H. Wharton minister to the United States. 
A Httle later Memucan Hunt was sent to act in conjunction with 
Wharton, and Fairfax Catlett was appointed secretary of legation 
with the authority of charge when the ministers should be absent 
from Washington. 

The negotiations that went on between the two governments from 
the expulsion of the Mexicans up to the end of the Jackson adminis- 
tration, March 4, 1837, referred primarily to the question of recog- 
nition ; but the subject was always considered with that of annexa- 
tion, to which recognition was prerequisite, more or less in view. 
Recognition came at length in the closing days of that administration 
by legislative action that was virtually final. It is impossible to 
detail here the whole course of the negotiation, but it may be worth 
while to note some features of the correspondence relating more 
directly to annexation, because of the light it afifords as to the situa- 
tion on both sides. 

In regard to the attitude of the United States authorities, the 
letters of the Texan commissioners to their government serve to 
indicate that they were, on the whole, assured of sympathy. To 
President Burnet, Austin wrote from New Orleans, June 10, 1836, 
that he believed that if he had been furnished with the necessary 
official documents, he could have secured recognition before leaving 
Washington. The feeling there was decidedly ardent in favor of 
Texas. On July 16 Collinsworth and Grayson wrote President 
Burnet that they had had two interviews with Secretary Forsyth 
and had found him uncommunicative ; but he had stated that he 
knew the annexation of Texas was a favorite measure — when it 
could be accomplished with propriety — of President Jackson's.^ 
Again, August 11, Grayson wrote W. H. Jack, then secretary of 
state under Houston, as follows : " As I have said before, there is 
in my mind no doubt that the present Administration, can carry the 
measure of Annexation, — General Jackson feels the utmost solicitude 
for it and we know how much that will count." ^ November 13, 
Collinsworth wrote that he had secured an interview with President 
Jackson and had been informed that nothing could be done until 
after a report from the United States agent that had been sent to 
Texas ; and he added that, without pretending to have official infor- 

1 Diplomatic, Consular, and Domestic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, 
file 295. This collection, of which the full title is given in this instance, will be cited 
hereafter simply as Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas. 

^Il>id., file 618. 



Movement for the Annexatio7i of Texas 76 

mation, he thought it safe to hazard the opinion that Jackson was in 
favor of the measures contained in their instructions. 

Now and then a note of doubt brings discord into this cheerful 
song of diplomacy. For example, Fairfax Catlett writes to Austin 
from Mobile, January 11, 1837, after having read Jackson's message 
of December 21 : 

You have doubtless by this time received President Jackson's message 
in relation to Texas affairs. I cannot express the regret, with which I 
gradually awoke to the unwelcome truth, that he is opposed to the imme- 
diate recognition of Texian independence. I did not anticipate so cold- 
blooded a policy from him. 

Such fears and depressing speculations, however, are only for a 
moment. So long as Jackson is President, the general tone of the 
correspondence is sometimes impatient, but almost invariably hope- 
ful. Catlett himself continues in the same letter as follows : 

There is something within me however, that whispers that the mes- 
sage was a message of expediency not intended to sway the Congress 
from a just and generous measure, but to lull the jealousy of foreign 
powers, and gull the national vanity of miserable Mexico, while the work 
goes not the less surely on, and approaches the culmination of all that 
you most desire ; — not only recognition but annexation likewise. 

On the Texas side appears a strong and practically unanimous 
desire for annexation, and confidence that it will not be long delayed. 
In his letter of September 12, 1836, from Velasco, Henry M. Morfit, 
the agent whom Jackson had sent to Texas, informed Forsyth, after 
summarizing the conditions on which Burnet's cabinet had agreed 
to offer the new-born republic to the United States, that 

the desire of the people to be admitted into our confederacy is so 
prevailing, that any conditions will be acceptable which will include the 
guaranty of a republican form of government, and will not impair the 
obligations of contracts. The old settlers are composed, for the most 
part, of. industrious farmers, who are tired of the toils of war, and are' 
anxious to raise up their families under the auspices of good laws, and 
leave them the inheritance of a safe'' and free government.^ 

Austin's instructions to Wharton, which are dated November 18, 
1836, advise him that he is to make every effort to accomplish the 
second great object of his mission — annexation, and they give a 
lengthy and moderate discussion of the subject in almost every 
aspect.'^ December 10, Austin wrote Wharton "*: 

^ Ibid., file 279. 

2 House Ex. Doc. 35, Vol. 2, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 26-27. 
'^Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 52. 
^Ibid., file 58. 



']'] G. p. Garrison 

Public anxiety is unabated on the subject of annexation to the U. S. 
The opinion in favor of that measure is much more decisive, if possible, 
than when you left. It is therefore expected that you will press that 
matter with as much earnestness as prudence will permit. 

Nor did the Texans appear to be over-solicitous about the condi- 
tions on which annexation was to be secured. Morfit's expression 
on this point has been quoted already. The instructions to Wharton 
state, in general terms, that he must guard the right of Texas to 
become a state without delay on an equal footing with the others ; to 
subdivide its territory into other states as might suit itself, the limit 
of the number being fixed ; to retain possession of the public domain, 
unless the United States assumed the Texas debt ; to have the acts 
of its government held valid ; to be free from restrictions on slavery 
not imposed on the other slaveholding states ; etc. One of the most 
interesting features of the instructions is that which authorizes the 
minister, in case the Rio Grande is seriously objected to as the bound- 
ary line with Mexico, to agree to a line much farther north, which, 
had it been adopted, would have left in possession of that country all 
the Mexican settlements over which Texas had not fully established 
jurisdiction. Another despatch dated December lo,^ and apparently 
written subsequent to the one for that day already mentioned, adds 
the following: 

It is certainly desirable that Texas should enter the x^merican Union 
at once, and undivided ; but should you discover that this condition, if 
positively insisted upon, is likely materially to affect the main object, 
which is annexation ; I am directed by the President to say, that you are 
at liberty to waive it, and agree to a territorial Government, with the 
necessary guarantees as to a state Govt., as soon as it is petitioned for. 
This Govt, has too much confidence in the just and liberal principles by 
which the United States are governed, to doubt that full and ample jus- 
tice will not be done us in every respect. 

The additional instructions given at the time of Hunt's appoint- 
ment, which are dated December 31, 1836, and signed by J. P. Hen- 
derson, acting secretary of state, inform him that the second main 
object of his mission is : 

The annexation of this Country to the United States either as a 
seperate State to be on equal footing with the other States of the Union 
or as a Territory with the right to admission into the Union as a State 
when she can number a sufficient amount of population to entitle her to 
admission according to the Laws of the United States ^ 

It is easy to see that the complications of the afifair, which were 
serious enough at the outset, but which grew rapidly as the negotia- 

!//'/</., file 58. 
'^ ihid., file 701. 



Movement for the Amiexation of Texas -]% 

tions progressed, were such as to invite diplomatic chess play, and it 
soon began. If the mother-country of Texas would not cultivate 
sufficiently cordial relations with her runaway children, England and 
France might ; and if the guards of the treaty portal refused to open 
at their request, some other entrance to the old home might be found. 
It may have been that the Texas diplomatists were not as smooth and 
wary as Van Buren and Forsyth, but they soon showed themselves to 
be resourceful. In the instructions by Acting Secretary of State 
Henderson to Minister Hunt, quoted in the last paragraph, the argu- 
ment is suggested to Mr. Hunt that 

ii! the event of [the refusal of (?)] that Government to receive 
this country mto the Union either as a State or as a Territory it may 
beconie necessary for Texas to form a Treaty of Amity and Commerce 
with England or some other European power which would forever and 
entirely preclude the people of the United States from enjoying any of 
the benefits resulting to Texas from the richness of her soil, commerce 
etc etc These reasons may be very forcibly impressed particularly 
upon the Representatives of the Northern States from whom we may 
expect to meet the greatest opposition, because should Texas be attached 
to the United States the immense consumption of those articles principallv 
nianufactured in the Northern States will more than compensate for the 
additional strength which its annexation will add to the political influence 
of the south. 

A little further along in the same document Henderson advises 
Hunt as follows : 

In the event that there should be doubts entertained whether a treaty 
made with this Government for its annexation to the United States would 
be ratified by a constitutional majority of the Senate of the United 
States you are instructed to call the attention of the authorities of that 
Government to the propriety and the practacability of passing a law by 
both houses (in which it would require a bare majority) taking in this 
Country as a part of her Territory, this' law could be passed, (provided 
Congress has the power to do so) based upon the vote of the people of 
lexas at the last election but in framing such an act great care should be 
used in order to secure all of the rights of Texas and its citizens as fully 
as you are instructed to have them attended to in any treaty which may 
be made, if such an act is passed you can give that Government the 
fullest assurance that it will be approved by this Government and people 
But inasmuch as this is rather a novel position you will speak of it with 
great prudence and caution. 

This is the first definite suggestion which I have been able to 
find of the expedient made so familiar by its later use in securing 
annexation when the method by treaty had failed. The instructions 
of Austin to Wharton, November i8, 1836, indicate the possibility 
of a second available string for the annexation bow, but it is only 

1 So in the original, but this word should have begun a new sentence. 



79 G. P. Gari'ison 

by a somewhat uncertain implication. Wharton is to use his " dis- 
cretion as to the proper mode of bringing . . . [the subject] before 
the executive or Congress ". It may be that the use of the word 
" Congress " is inadvertent, and that the meaning is that Wharton 
shall simply use his discretion in seeking to secure favorable action 
by the United States Senate. This construction, however, appears 
improbable. It is more likely that the alternative form of Austin's 
expression reflects the idea of a real alternative in the method by 
which annexation may be obtained. His statement implies that the 
subject may be laid either before the executive or before Congress, 
and in either case Wharton is to use his discretion as to the w^y in 
which he shall proceed. It is true that whenever Austin, in the 
same instructions and in other documents, mentions the contem- 
plated contract of annexation, he calls it a " treaty ", and in one 
place he even says that annexation " must be effected by a formal 
treaty which must be ratified by the Senate of Texas, in conformity 
with the Constitution " ; but it seems likely that in most cases he is 
using the word " treaty " rather in the general sense of an inter- 
national agreement than in its technical significance in the United 
States or the Republic of Texas. 

The idea of annexation by act of Congress is found also in 
another document originating in a quarter far distant from Texas, 
and so nearly contemporaneous with Austin's letter to Wharton as 
to preclude the likelihood of any direct connection between them. 
This is the message of Governor McDuffie of South Carolina to the 
legislature of that state on his retirement from office in 1836.^ He 
said: 

You are doubtless aware that the people of Texas, by an almost unan- 
imous vote, have expressed their desire to be admitted into our confeder- 
acy, and application will probably be made to congress for that purpose. 
In my opinion, congress ought riot even to entertain such a proposition, 
in the present state of the controversy. 

The report made by the Senate Committee- on Federal Relations, 
to which this part of the message was referred, expresses the convic- 
tion that when Texas has established a de facto government clothed 
with all the attributes of sovereignty and independence, the questions 
of recognition and of annexation may safely be confided to Congress. 

The recognition of the independence of Texas cleared the way for 
the direct effort to secure annexation ; but the struggle involved had 
shown the Texans how many and how great were the difficulties to 

"^ Niles" Register, LI, 229-230. 

2 Ibid., 277. The House report is ibid., 242. 



Movemejit for the Annexation of Texas 80 

be overcome. Their desire was unchanged ; but enthusiasm was giv- 
ing way to circumspection, and they were learning to curb their 
eagerness. Five months were suffered to elapse before Hunt, who 
was now sole minister of Texas at Washington,^ took up the matter 
officially with the United States government. But, before this phase 
of the movement can be considered, it becomes necessary to explain 
the difficulties I have mentioned; and the most serious of them, I 
need hardly say, arose from the growing opposition of the North to 
slavery. 

Up to the time of the Texan revolution, the influence of slavery 
in the political and social development of Texas had been of some 
importance, but it had not had the effect which historians have 
usually represented. The colonization of Texas was but another 
wave of the same tide of expansion that had already carried Anglo- 
American civilization westward over the Alleghenies and across the 
Mississippi. The causes of it had little connection with slavery. 
The friction with Mexico brought about by the antislavery legisla- 
tion of the Mexican government served for one or two brief periods 
to retard the growth of the colonies, but it disappeared before 1830 
and played no appreciable part in bringing on the revolution. Neither 
was the material help given Texas from the United States in the 
course of the revolution the result, in my opinion, of any systematic 
thought for the expansion of slavery. The principal motive that 
carried " volunteer immigrants ", as they were called, to Texas dur- 
ing the latter part of 1835 and the first part of the following year is 
well illustrated by an anecdote published in the Texas Almanac for 
1861 (p. 75) and attributed to General H. D. McLeod. It is to the 
effect that when Ward's battalion, which had been raised in Georgia, 
was passing through Montgomery, Alabama, on its way to Texas in 
the winter of 1835, it paraded for recruiting purposes. A flag at the 
head of the column bore the motto " Texas and Liberty " ; but, as 
the battalion marched along the street, a wit among the bystanders 
suggested that the words be changed to " Texas, Liberty, and Land ". 
This joke puts the matter in a nutshell. I am aware that some will 
differ from me in the opinion just stated ; and, while my aims are 
expository and not polemic, I regret that the limits of this paper 
forbid any defense of my position. It is my intention to publish ere 
long a statement of the evidence by which it is determined; but the 
subject is too large for adequate treatment here and must therefore 
be passed over for the present. 

The struggle for annexation, however, centers about the slavery 
issue ; but here again the point of view of our historians, it seems 

1 Wharton had left the United States soon after recognition was secured. 



8 1 G. P. Gar7'ison 

to me, has often been incorrect. Slavery is not to be charged with 
the success of the movement. On the contrary, it alone roused an 
opposition which came perilously near preventing, for a period that 
no one can estimate, the acquisition of Texas and leaving it a barrier 
to the westward extension of the United States, an agency for the 
promotion of foreign interests, and a menace to our national unity. 
That the slaveholding interest alone could not have accomplished 
annexation goes without saying. The states it controlled did not 
have votes enough for that in either house of Congress. The result 
can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a triumph of the impulse 
toward expansion which has so often manifested itself in our history 
and against which the brave energy of John Quincy Adams and the 
matchless eloquence of Clay and Webster were arrayed in vain. Had 
there been no slavery in Texas, the triumph would have been 
achieved with less than half the struggle. Had there been none in 
either country, there would have been no struggle at all. If the 
application of Texas had but come a few years earlier, it is probable 
that recognition and annexation would have been secured in quick 
succession and with comparative ease. The slavery issue would not 
then have so compUcated the process ; nor is it to be supposed that 
the risk of war with Mexico would have proved to be any effectual 
hindrance. The recent Panama episode is teaching us a great deal 
about ourselves, and I cannot believe that in the twenties and thirties 
of the nineteenth century we were essentially different. 

As the hands pointed, however, on the clock of destiny, the 
annexation movement was ill-timed. While the quarrel of Texas 
with Mexico was passing from difference and recrimination to de- 
fiance and the rude arbitrament of war, the genius of Occidental 
civilization had girded itself for mighty work on both sides of the 
Atlantic. A broadening conception of the rights of man had begun to 
threaten privilege in every quarter. The rising of the American 
demos had overthrown the political aristocrats of the seaboard and 
seated in the presidential chair the king of the western commonalty. 
The July revolution had brought France a faint reminder of the 
days of '89, and, as it spread, had given the throne of continental 
Europe a warning shake. In England Parliamentary reform had 
relieved the abuses of five hundred years, and the new philanthropy 
had abolished slavery in all the colonies of Great Britain, and had 
paid the bill. Finally, just at the time when Texas was engaged in 
its desperate struggle against the Mexican invaders, the trumpet- 
call to the " irrepressible conflict " was sounded by both sides on the 
floor of the American Congress, where issue was joined concerning 



Movement for the Annexation of Texas 82 

the right of petition relative to slavery. The personality of Adams 
and Calhoun, the two great leaders who stood over against each other 
in this opening fight/ is a sufficient guaranty of the honesty and 
strength of the convictions that clashed. It is, in fact, devotion to 
their faith, religious, political, and social, that has given the Teutonic 
stock world-wide supremacy. Though it has often inspired the de- 
termined champions of error, in the long run it has always made for 
truth and right. 

The issue of annexation was thus involved from the outset with 
that of the nationalization and expansion of slavery. The occasion 
brought the most extensive use of the right that had been challenged 
— so far as it applied to this distinctive Southern institution — that 
our history has ever witnessed ; and when the stream of petitions 
relative to Texas began to pour in upon Congress, it mingled with 
a similar stream of those praying for the abolition of slavery in 
the District of Columbia. Along with the petitions came legislative 
resolutions from various states relating to the same subjects. The 
people were becoming profoundly stirred ; and this sudden mani- 
festation of unfamiliar forces threw most of the political leaders into 
a state of absolute terror. Even Jackson adopted an attitude of 
caution entirely foreign to his nature, while Van Buren studied the 
situation and trimmed>^nd Clay, " thinking too precisely on the 
event ", was driven to fatal irresolution. 

Those who have gathered their knowledge of the relations of the 
Republic of Texas with the United States from the standard his- 
tories rather than from the sources will probably have the impression 
that a harmonious outcry for recognition and annexation went up 
from the slaveholding states as soon as the question was presented. 
There was, however, one notable exception. In his message to the 
South Carolina legislature near the end of the year 1836,^ the retir- 
ing governor, George JMcDuffie, protested strongly against any action 
on behalf of Texas. After a ringing argument in favor of guard- 
ing the domestic institutions of the state against outside interference, 
he went on to extend the doctrine to the case of Texas. The ex- 
pressions in his message most in point are as follows : 

I have looked with very deep concern, not unmingled with regret, 
upon the occurrences which have taken place during the present year, in 
various parts of the United States, relative to the civil war which is still 
in progress, between the republic of Mexico and one of her revolted 

1 I have not forgotten tlie Missouri Compromise, but I am inclined to tliink students 
of American history will agree that the real beginning of the " irrepressible conflict '' 
was in the struggle over the right of petition with reference to slavery. 

'^ Ntles^ Registei-, LI, 229-230. 



S;^ G. P. Garrison 

provinces. It is true that no country can be responsible for the sympa- 
thies of its citizens ; but I am nevertheless utterly at a loss to perceive what 
title either of the parties to this controversy can have to the sympathies of 
the American people. If it be alleged that the insurgents of Texas are emi- 
grants from the United States, it is obvious to reply that, by their voluntary 
expatriation, under whatever circumstances of adventure, of speculation, 
of honor, or of infamy, they have forfeited all claim to our fraternal 
regard. . . . There is but too much reason to believe that many of them 
have gone as mere adventurers, speculating upon the chances of estab- 
lishing an independent government in Texas, and of seizing that im- 
mense and fertile domain by the title of the sword. But be this as it 
may, when they became citizens of Mexico, they became subject to the 
constitution and laws of that country ; and whatever changes the Mexi- 
can people may have since made in that constitution and those laws, they 
are matters with which foreign states can have no concern, and of which 
they have no right to take cognizance. I trust, therefore, that the state 
of South Carolina will give no countenance, direct or indirect, open or 
concealed, to ani^ acts which may compromit the neutrality of the United 
States, or bring into question their plighted faith. . . . If we admit 
Texas into our union, while Mexico in still waging war against that 
province, with a view to re-establish her supremacy over it, we shall, by 
the very «<:/ itself, make ouselves a party to the war. Nor can we take tl is 
step, without incurring this heavy responsibility, until Mexico herself 
shall recognize the independence of her revolted province. 

The part of the message relative to Texas was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations in both the House and the Senate. 
The House committee brought in a favorable report, which was 
adopted,^ and the nature of which is sufficiently indicated by the 
following extract : 

The committee fully agree with his excellency on the propriety and 
sound policy of the government of the United States maintaining a strict 
neutrality with all foreign nations, and especially with Mexico in her 
contest with Texas ; and that we are the last people who should set an 
example of impertinent interference with the internal; concerns of other 
states. . . . South Carolina cannot consent, under a supposed idea of 
self-interest, to violate the sanctity of the law of nations, or that neutrality 
which should always be guarded by the United States towards a foreign 
nation engaged in an internal struggle. Under the present circumstances, 
to acknowledge the independence of Texas and receive her into this 
union, could be no less than a declaration of war against Mexico, and of 
doubtful policy to the older slave-holding states. 

These documents have been referred to thus at length because, 
among other reasons, of the exceptional nature of the argument as 
coming from Calhoun's own state, the very citadel of the slavery 
interest, and especially from such a champion of that interest as 

1 Niles' Register, LI, 242, 273. 



Movement for the Annexation of Texas 84 

George McDuffie.^ To those who believe that annexation was due to 
slavery alone, it should be profoundly instructive. 

The Senate committee made an unfavorable report, which was 
adopted " by nearly a unanimous vote "-. The report was presented 
by Ex-governor James Hamilton, who soon became identified with 
Texas ; but it contains nothing that stands out sufficiently for repro- 
duction here. 

In the interval between the act of recognition and the proffer 
of annexation, the Texas minister at Washington, like Van Buren, 
studied the situation, and made voluminous reports. These are of 
great interest and value in following the tortuous course of the 
administration as it sought to make up its mind. April 15, 1837, 
Hunt wrote to Henderson from Vicksburg, Mississippi^, that he 
thought a secret agent should be sent to England to purchase a 
treaty there with valuable commercial concessions. Recognition by 
England, he thought, would guarantee annexation. The South was 
so ardent therefor that failure would dissolve the Union, and the 
Northern politicians would yield before going to that extremity. He 
went on to say that nothing had so increased the zeal of Southern 
politicians for Texas as the question of John Quincy Adams in the 
House whether it would be in order to present a petition from slaves. 
By this act one of their worst enemies had helped them more than 
" the most studied movements " of their best friends. Open negotia- 
tions with Great Britain would probably prevent annexation by 
provoking a paper issue with the Abolitionists, and action should be 
taken in a way that would cause as little excitement as possible ; for 
fanaticism would temporarily overrule the wisest measures. But 
the Northerners were a law-abiding people ; and if a treaty of annex- 
ation could be secured, the trouble would all be over. He added, 
by the way, that, having secured recognition, and not expecting 
favorable action as to annexation for the time, he thought it might 
be best for him to visit Thomas H. Benton, who could do Texas 
more service in that respect perhaps than any one else in the United 
States. 

' McDuffie afterward became an ardent annexationist. As senator from South 
Carolina, he voted for the joint resolution in 1S45 and made one of the strongest argu- 
ments in its favor that the occasion called forth. Relative to this, Daniel Webster 
remarked, in the course of a controversial tilt with McDuffie in the Senate, July 28, 
1846 : " I think the most powerful argument ever addressed to the people of the United 
States against the annexation of Texas was from the Governor of South Carolina ; and I 
think the greatest speech in favor of it was made by the Senator from South Carolina — 
idem peisoneni \sic'\ !" See Congressioual Globe, 29 Cong., i sess., 1 1 54. 

2 Niles' Register, LI, 277. 

8 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 714. 



85 G. P. Gar 7' is on 

Two much more interesting letters than this were written by 
Catlett to Henderson during Hunt's absence from Washington in 
the spring of 1837. The first is dated April 29^ In it Catlett tells 
a curious tale of how he had been suddenly summoned to the office 
of the Secretary of State and informed by the chief clerk — by direc- 
tion, of course, of the Secretary himself — that the department had 
just received some important information from the United States 
consul in the City of Mexico. It was to the effect that a resolu- 
tion to sell Texas, " and as far south as might be deemed expedient ", 
to the British government at twenty-five cents an acre had been 
introduced at a secret session of the Mexican congress and would cer- 
tainly be adopted. A question as to whether the consul's letter indi- 
cated that the British government had offered to make the purchase, 
or would agree to it, was answered in the negative. Extracts from 
the letter including the most essential parts were requested and 
obtained. They showed that the sale was proposed in order to 
pay off the debt of sixty-eight million dollars due from Mexico to 
English subjects. These extracts were despatched in a lengthy com- 
munication dated May 7-, and containing matter of peculiar interest. 
Catlett sent a copy of a letter which he had written to Forsyth on 
May 2, and which serves to show that he had not neglected his 
opportunity for an important move in the diplomatic game. He 
thanked the Secretary very heartily for the information that had 
been given, and said that this regard for the welfare of Texas would 
" doubtless strengthen the filial feeling which it has always cherished 
for its parent commonwealth ". He then inquired whether the 
United States government thought Mexico's offer to Great Britain 
would be accepted, and whether it w^ml^^take any steps to prevent 
such an undesirable consummation. He went on to suggest the 
danger that the British government might have made secret over- 
tures to Mexico and that, in spite of the apparent unreasonableness 
of the thing, it might be really seeking to possess itself of Texas. 
He excused himself for asking such questions as the letter contained 
by setting forth the deep solicitude the government of Texas would 
naturally feel concerning the subject, and the impossibility of its 
obtaining any direct information. In a paragraph following the 
copy of this letter Catlett explained to Henderson that he wrote the 
letter to call the attention of Forsyth to the fact that the subject was 
as important to the United States as to Texas, and that their interests 
in respect to it were identical. He wished also, of course, to elicit 
such information as he could. 

1 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 284. 

'^ Ibid., file 285. 



Movement for the Annexation of Texas 86 

Forsyth was doubtless sorry that he had allowed the cat to peep 
at all from the bag- he was holding, and the letter of the Texas 
charge must have cost the Secretary of State at least one sleepless 
night. Catlett went on to recount, in his despatch of May 7 detailing 
the course of the affair, that the next day (May 3) he had a note 
from the chief clerk of the Department of State asking him to call 
at his convenience, and that he presented himself at the office the 
same morning. As he entered, Mr. Forsyth, who was just leaving 
the room, saw him and invited him to an interview, which had evi- 
dently not been intended for that morning, and a very interesting 
colloquy ensued. Forsyth said he thought Catlett had better take 
back his letter ; that some expressions in it, though their use was 
justified, might lead to future misunderstanding. He referred espe- 
cially to "Parent Commonwealth''. Catlett replied that the ex- 
pression was not meant to indicate that Texas owed its origin to the 
United States government, but was intended only in compliment, 
since the Texans were nearly all natives of the United States, and 
since they had adopted the same form of government and the same 
institutions as those of that country. But Forsyth " said that it was 
an expression which would still be made use of by the enemies of the 
administration and by all such as were inimical to the United States 
and to Texas;- — that all correspondence in relation to Texas would 
probably be called for next winter by congress, and that, while the 
best feeling and wishes for the prosperity of Texas were cherished, 
it behooved him to be careful to make no admissions, which might 
be interpreted as showing an undue interest in the success of our 
revolutionary struggle ". To this Catlett answered that he knew 
" the situation of the United States was a delicate and embarrassing 
one, and that it was by no means . . . [his] desire to render it 
more so, but that the identity of interests between the countries was 
so striking and apparent, and pointed so clearly to the United States 
preventing Great Britain from negotiating for the purchase of 
Texas, that . . . [he] could not but encourage the hope, that some 
assurance would be given to ... [his] Government, that if any 
negotiations were opened between Great Britain and Mexico, the 
United States would immediately interfere ". " In what way could 
we interfere?", asked Forsyth. " By distinctly intimating", replied 
Catlett, " to the British Govt that the United States could never 
consent to Great Britain's obtaining possession of Texas ". Forsyth 
suggested, " Great Britain in return might say the same to us " ; the 
answer to which was, " If she did, it would be easy to reply that the 
United States would make no such atten-,pt, that she had already 



8; O. P. Garrison 

acknowledged the separate existence of Texas as an Independent 
Republic, but that if it were the unequivocal desire of the people 
of Texas to be admitted into this Union, that their wishes would be 
properly respected and listened to ". At this point the exchange of 
argument ended, and Forsyth went on to say that, while the subject 
was one of common interest, he had no idea that Great Britain would 
accept the Mexican offer or that any overtures for the purchase of 
Texas had come from that country ; that he would cheerfully com- 
municate all information he could give that might be of interest to 
Texas, but he could express no opinion as to the policy that would 
be pursued by the United States ; " that notwithstanding the numer- 
ous ties by \\(hich the people of the two countries were virtually 
bound together, it was necessary that the intercourse between their 
Governments should be carried on as if there was no peculiar rela- 
tionship between them ; — that some of the expressions in . . . 
[Catlett's] letter might be referred to on some future occasion as 
showing that an undue interest had been taken by the Government 
of the United States in t-he affairs of Texas and that he would prefer 
returning it to . . . [him]". Catlett then took back the letter, be- 
cause, as he explained, its purpose had been accomplished. He 
assured Forsyth, with a refreshing assumption of innocence, that 
inexperience alone had prompted the writing, and the conference 
was at an end. In his letter to Henderson Catlett added that he had 
obtained information from Mr. Cralle, on which he relied as correct, 
that Great Britain had been approached by Mexico some time before 
on the subject of purchasing Texas and had given a decided refusal. 
Another communication from Catlett to Henderson, written May 
25 and 3o\ reported that he thought the administration would use 
every exertion to keep down the question of annexation, but that a 
strong effort would be made by the South to have the matter decided 
by the ensuing Congress. He said Forsyth had told him that if 
Congress had not tied the hands of the executive, Mexico would 
already have been taught to respect the rights of American com- 
merce. The despatch closed with the statement that, while many 
persons in the United States regarded the issue as doubtful, it was 
clear " to the sagacious and intelligent " that the government of 
that country had so far compromised itself by the act of recognition 
as to have made common cause with Texas ; that only the imprudence 
of Texas could prevent the ties between them from increasing " in 
strength and holiness " ; and that it was impossible that the deport- 
ment of Texas " should be regulated by too scrupulous an adherence 
to the established principles of international law "'. 

1 Diplomatic Correspondence of 'I'exas, file 306. 



Movement for the Annexation of Texas 88 

As to the delay in proposing annexation, the correspondence goes 
to show that it was due to the refusal of the United States authorities 
to entertain the proposition so long as Mexico persisted in attempting 
to reconquer Texas. A despatch from Hunt to Henderson, dated 
Vicksburg, May 30. 1837^, states that Forsyth had distinctly so de- 
scribed the attitude of the administration. It can scarcely be 
doubted, however, that the refusal was due still more to the fear of 
a divided and uncertain public sentiment in the United States. 

On July II, Hunt reported from Washington- that he had been 
accorded an interview with President Van Buren, and had expressed 
to him the hope of nearer relations between the United States and 
Texas than mere diplomatic intercourse The President had replied 
warmly, with dignity, and at length, but the letter reveals in what he 
said only " glittering . . . generalities ". Hunt remarked that, in 
accordance with his instructions from the government of Texas, he 
. would commit himself to no treaty stipulations until he was advised 
further. 

In the same communication Hunt said that, while he had first 
urged a secret mission to Great Britain, he had finally become con- 
vinced that the appointment of a minister was wise.'^ The mere 
announcement had so aroused the Southern states to the danger of 
losing Texas that they would present an unbroken line of resistance 
to any anti-Texas administration. He thought the people south of 
the Potomac would prefer the dissolution of the Union to the loss of 
Texas. They and the people of Texas had common interests, origin, 
and history, and " in this age of fanaticism on the subject of slavery " 
they would force their government to adopt the Texans, or would 
create a new order of things. He was sanguine that the administra- 
tion would be compelled to make annexation a " leading issue ". 

Hunt then proceeded to define the attitude of certain prominent 
men and to describe, in general terms, the whole situation. Webster 
had entered the field for the presidency. He and his friends were 
expected to be decidedly hostile to Texas. He had raised the cry 
of Southern preponderance in the councils of the Union. His in- 
fluence was in the northern and middle states, but was dominant only 
in Massachusetts and Vermont; his opposition had solidified the 
South warmly for Texas. The Cabinet was said to be sectionally 
divided on the question of annexation, but Hunt had it on good 
authority that Woodbury would support the views of the President, 
which would give Texas a majority of one. Clamor about financial 

1 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 718. 

•^ Ibid., file 719. 

* Henderson had been appointed. 



89 G. P. Garrison 

troubles had been weakening the Jackson party, and in New York 
and Pennsylvania, where the President was considered invincible, 
recent events seemed ominous of defeat. In the south everything 
depended on his course as to slavery, and nothing else would help him 
there so much as hearty support of annexation. Hunt had thought 
it not unwise to encourage the idea that Texas would stand by the 
administration under whose auspices it entered the Union. He sug- 
gested also the propriety of his being duly authorized, if the subject 
of annexation should come before the next Congress, " to employ 
some efficient and able person, having influence with the members of 
the non-slaveholding states, to counteract the intrigues of Mr. Web- 
ster and the enemies of Texas ". He repeated that " a well paid, 
efficient, and if you please, secret agent, acting under my direction 
and having influence with the members of the non-slaveholding 
States, would be a most important enablement unto the success of our 
cause ". He advised against an attempt at conciliation of the party 
" known ... as Northern fanatics " ; for that might impair " that 
firm, devoted and enthusiastic unanimity of the South, which is, 
indeed, our main support ". 

August 4, 1837,^ came the long-delayed proposal of annexation 
in a formal communication from Hunt to Forsyth. The Texas min- 
ister sketched the history of that country and said that it sought 
annexation because of its kinship in blood, language, and institutions 
with the United States. He gave its estimated area and population, 
and a brief statement of its resources. Texas, he said, neither feared 
reconquest by Mexico, nor sought protection against European in- 
terference. It offered a market for all agricultural products of the 
United States except sugar and -cotton. Delay might be fatal to 
annexation, for Texas was establishing relations with foreign powers 
that might develop insurmountable obstacles ; and it might, by means 
of commercial treaties having special relation to the two states men- 
tioned, and because of its better adapted soil, rival the United States 
in the production of both and drain away the population from that 
country. If Texas remained independent, the very similarity be- 
tween the two countries would bring about a conflict of interests. 
Annexation would insure the United States control of the Gulf of 
Mexico, and might contribute to peace with the Indians on the 
frontier of the two countries. The question was asked " in the name 
of national honor, humanity, and justice " if a nation whose career 
had been marked by constant violation of treaty obligations, by 
licentious revolutions, and by shameful mistreatment of its people 

1 House Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., I scss., pp. 2-1 1. 



Movement for the Annexation of Texas 90 

had not " thereby forfeited all claims to the respect of the Govern- 
ments of civilized nations ". 

A letter from Hunt to R. A. Irion^ written the same day reported 
this formal opening of negotiations to the government of Texas. 
The minister said that he still hoped for annexation, but the course 
of the official newspaper (the Globe) had not been encouraging. 
Hunt's friend and relative, John C. Jones of North Carolina, who 
was intimate with the editor, Mr. Blair, had sought to influence him 
to support annexation, but had failed. Blair's private opinions were 
in favor of it, but the President had instructed him to be neutral for 
a time. Van Buren would favor the most popular course as soon as 
he ascertained what it was. 

August 10, Hunt wrote Irion^ concerning the proposal made six 
days before : " I thought it best to say nothing of the slave question, 
which as you know is more important than any other connected with 
the subject of annexation ". The President of the United States 
seemed anxious to suppress the desire which Hunt had shown to 
push on the movement; and one of Van Buren's intimate friends 
had urged the deferring of the project so strongly that a show of 
resentment had been required in order to get rid of him. This 
gentleman was told bv Hunt that, if annexation failed, the President 
and his advisers would be responsible for the result, which might be 
fatal to the Union. The Texas minister remarked in passing that he 
himself was ardently attached to the Union, and that he thought 
annexation would prolong, if not perpetuate it. His fears concern- 
ing Van Buren's attitude led him to suggest that Irion should address 
a proposal for annexation to some member of Congress to be pre- 
sented to that body. The name was to be left blank for Hunt to fill 
in when the occasion came for the use of the document. A postscript 
dated August 11 said that Hunt had just ascertained Forsyth to be 
violently opposed to annexation. 

Not till August 25, did Forsyth reply to the proposal of annexa- 
tion. His answer^ disclaimed at the outset any unfriendly spirit 
toward Texas. This was followed up by declining to look into the 
historical facts recited by Hunt and by expressing the hope that the 
act of recognition would lead Texas to cherish close relations with 
the United States and abstain from connections detrimental to that 
country. The proposed acquisition of territory would be different 

' Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 726. Irion had succeeded J. P. Hen- 
derson as secretary of state. 

■^/6id., file 728. 

^ House Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., i sess., pp. 11-13. The refusal of the proposition, 
while perfectly clear, was not in direct terms, but only by implication. 



91 G. P. Garrison 

from any the United States had ever made, inasmuch as it involved 
the absorption of an independent sovereignty. It involved also a 
question of a war with Mexico, to which country the United States 
was under treaty obligations that precluded even reserving the pro- 
posal for future consideration. 

The rejoinder of Hunt,^ which was dated September 12, argued 
that the negotiations for the purchase of Texas from Mexico before 
Mexican independence had been acknowledged by Spain involved 
as great a breach of treaty obligations, if the principle on which the 
United States claimed to act could be allowed, as the acceptance of 
the proffered annexation. Undeniably, he thought, a sovereign 
power had as much right to dispose of the whole of itself to another 
as to dispose of a part. Texas did not feel under obligations to fol- 
low any special foreign policy because it had been recognized first 
by the United States ; and if its relations should become such as 
seriously to affect the interests of that country, he thought complaint 
would be unreasonable after the offer of all it had to give had been 
declined. But he assured the Secretary of State, and through him 
the President of the United States, that the prompt and decisive 
rejection of the proposal would not be charged to unfriendliness. 
Six days later Hunt wrote Irion ^ that he hoped a resolution would 
be introduced in one of the houses of Congress at the approaching 
regular session that would request the Texas minister to state the 
terms on which Texas sought admission into the Union, and that a 
motion to accept the terms would be adopted by both houses. The 
President would add his approval. 

For about a year from this time forward the despatches tell a 
tale of daily alternating hopes and fears, with the prospect of annex- 
ation gradually on the decline. October 20, 1837, Hunt wrote Irion-^ 
that the state of the question was " delicate and precarious ". Suc- 
cess seemed to depend on war between the United States and Mexico. 
The friends of the measure, taking their cue from the President and 
the Cabinet, were begging for time to save the party in the north, 
while Hunt himself was urging the danger of alienating the South 
by delay. He had threatened, in conversation with an influential 
friend of Van Buren's, to ask the Texas government for a recall; 
but a communication so hedged about with secrecy that he could not 
even state its substance in the despatch induced him to remain. On 
the next day, October 21, P. W. Grayson, who had just come from 
Texas to the assistance of Hunt, wrote President Houston a sup- 

1 House Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., i sess., pp. 14-18. 

2 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 732. 
^Ibid., file 736. 



Movement for the Annexation of Texas 92 

plementary note, in which he said that the annexationists were then 
depending much on Clay to lead the fight for the measure if the 
Cabinet continued its equivocal course; and he made the interesting 
observation by the way that Hunt's letters would show " that even 
the old fanatic J. O. Adams is committed for the acquisition of 
Texas". Hunt, in a letter of November 15 to Irion,^ represents 
Forsyth as being then " a warm advocate for the measure of annexa- 
tion and for having it accomplished as early as possible ". The 
friends of the measure were increasing very fast in the west. Hunt 
was informed that there was -not a single dissentient in the IlHnois 
delegation. Senator Allen of Ohio favored the measure. So did 
both the senators from Michigan personally, and they promised to 
do so officially if their constituents could be reconciled to it. But 
December 7, Grayson reports to Houston that " there is no solid 
foundation on luhich to build a hope that the measure can now 
he carried . . . both parties here are afraid to move in the matter 
for fear of losing popularity in the North ". 

On January 4, 1838, was initiated the attempt, so often suggested 
in the letters of Hunt and Grayson, to accomplish annexation by Con- 
gressional action. Naturally the work began in the Senate. There 
were found the most determined and aggressive champions of the 
measure ; and initiative by that body would not seem too great a 
departure from the well-trodden paths of diplomacy. It should be 
observed, in fact, that the plan does not seem, for the time, to have 
contemplated action by the legislative "independently of the treaty- 
making power, but only such a step as would force the hand of the 
unwilling executive and push him into negotiations. On the day 
named, Preston of South Carolina introduced in the Senate a resolu- 
tion sounding the now famous political war-cry of " reannexation " 
and asserting the desirability and expediency of resuming possession 
of Texas, which was declared to have been " surrendered " in 1819. 
Three months later he spoke for two hours in support of his resolu- 
tion. The paralyzing effect of the subject is sufficiently illustrated 
by the fact that, though the Senate has never been famous for 
" dumb sittings ", when he sat down there seemed to be no one else 
that wished to say a word. Walker, however, was not present. 
June 14, the resolution was taken up again and tabled by the decisive 
vote of 24 to 14." How the question of annexation was raised dur- 
ing the same session in the House, and how it was dealt with will 
appear further on. 

^ Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 735. 
^JVi/ts' Register, LIV, 255. 



93 G. P. Garrison 

By the end of January, 1838, Hunt began to consider the outlook 
for annexation hopeless. On the thirty-first of that month he sent 
Irion a long communication' describing the contemporaneous aspect 
of the movement in detail. He was confident that he had fully 
ascertained the views of the administration and the general feeling 
in Congress, and he wrote, " I can no longer repel the conviction that 
the measure is utterly impracticable under existing circumstances ". 
His despatch is a confidentially frank, searching, and faithful review 
of the situation. After remarking that the acquisition of Texas had 
been the settled policy of the United States for twelve years, as the 
instructions of Secretaries of State Clay, Van Buren, McLane, and 
Forsyth to ministers in Mexico showed clearly, and after stating that 
the President and several of the Cabinet still wished it, he continues : 

But hampered as they are by their party trammels on the one hand, 
and their treaty obligations with Mexico on the other, by the furious 
opposition of all the free States, by the fear of incurring the charge of 
false dealing and injustice, and of involving this country in a war in 
which they are now doubtful whether they would even be supported by a 
majority of their own citizens, and which would be at once branded by 
their enemies at home and abroad as an unjust war, instigated for the 
very purpose of gaining possession of Texas and for no other, they dare 
not and will not come out openly for the measure, so long as the relative 
position of the three parties continues the same as it is at present. 

Hunt then goes on to say that he had relied for success on a 
declaration of war by the United States against Mexico, which had 
finally become altogether improbable. " If the United States desire 
Texas ", he says, " the proposition should now come from them. Our 
true policy now, in every aspect of view, is to appear indififerent upon 
the subject, and leave it for this government to solicit of us the 
consummation of a measure which, I am well assured will be the 
more desired by them, the less solicitous we appear about it our- 
selves." Describing the situation in Congress, he expresses the fear 
that Preston's resolutions will be tabled, and then adds : 

In the course of a confidential conversation, which I had with Mr. 
Clay, a few days since, he assured me that he was friendly to the annexa- 
tion of Texas, but that in his opinion, the time had not yet arrived when 
the question could be taken up in congress with any probability of suc- 
cess. Petitions upon petitions still continue daily pouring in against us 
from the North and East. 

Finally, some lines written later say that the hopes of the annex- 
ationists have just been revived by a report of prospective changes 
in the Cabinet and the recently developed uneasiness of the adminis- 

' Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 743. 



Movement for the Annexation of Texas 94 

tration over the probability of a treaty between Texas and Great 
Britain. 

Early in February Hunt writes again/ this time in a most hopeful 
strain. He has been led to believe that the United States govern- 
ment is on the point of taking active steps toward annexation. In a 
strictly confidential interview with Calhoun, saving the privilege of 
communication with the Texas government, he has learned that the 
administration is considering the policy of despatching a private mis- 
sion to Mexico to secure the acquiescence of that country in the 
annexation movement. Calhoun has just received a note from a 
member of the Cabinet which leaves little doubt that the mission 
would result favorably, as information lately obtained would prove. 
Hunt is of the opinion that the unusual energy of the government is 
due mainly to the fact that he has informed Forsyth of his intention 
to ask to be recalled. 

But the prospect of a revival of the movement was not realized. 
In March Hunt wrote- that he was gratified to receive instructions 
from President Lamar to show no further solicitude for annexation, 
and a few days later he reported^ that several members of Congress 
from the south had expressed their intention, if Texas was not 
annexed to the Union, to " advocate its annexation to the slave 
holding states ". March 12, he wrote* that, in his opinion and " that 
of many distinguished gentlemen from the South ", unless Texas was 
annexed, the Union would soon be dissolved because of Northern 
interference with slavery in the south, which annexation would pre- 
vent by giving the South preponderance in the Senate. " Domestic 
slavery ", he said, " in the United States and Texas, must, from 
various circumstances, stand or fall together." The failure of 
annexation would be at the risk of civil war in the Union, " for the 
fanatical spirit of abolition is unquestionably on the increase " ; but 
the' success of the measure would so check that spirit as to give the 
slaveholding states " perfect security ". 

Meanwhile the House was engaged in a vain struggle to keep 
back the question, which was seeking entry by the door of petition. 
This door to legislative consideration it had been sought practically 
to close against whatever might serve to promote the agitation of 
the slavery issue, but this could not be efifectually done with men like 
John Quincy Adams in the House. The recognition of the inde- 
pendence of Texas in March, 1837, had brought the subject of 

1 February 3, Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 744. 

2 March 3, ibid., file 745. 

3 March 9, ibid. , file 746. 
^'Ibid., file 747. 



95 G. F. Garrison 

annexation, hitherto in the background, now openly to the front. 
The proposal made in August and its prompt rejection have been 
referred to already, and the claim of the conservatives and the peace 
makers now was that the question had been disposed of ; but Adams 
refused to believe it. During the special session of the Twenty-fifth 
Congress, which met in September, 1837, and the regular session 
following, memorials and petitions against the annexation of Texas 
signed by multiplied thousands poured in and grew upon the table 
of the House into a mass that Howard of Maryland, chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, said might be measured by 
cubic feet. They seem to have come mainly from Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio. A few counter-petitions from the South 
came in, but they were evidently intended to bring that method of 
dealing with the subject into contempt; for the Southern members 
of Congress had set their faces sternly against it. But Carter of 
Tennessee, who doubted the expediency of annexation, stated in the 
House on July 13, 1838, that it had been difficult to restrain the 
masses in the south from petitioning Congress in its favor. The 
House, on December 12, 1837, had by a vote of 127 to 68 laid the 
whole subject of annexation, with the papers relating to it, on the 
table without reference ; but through an inadvertence, as was after- 
ward claimed, the petitions on the subject had been subsequently 
allowed to go to the Committee on Foreign Relations. On June 13, 
1838, a resolution was reported in the House from that committee 
discharging it from further consideration of the subject. The next 
day Waddy Thompson, from South Carolina, offered an amend- 
ment directing the President to take the proper steps for the annex- 
ation of Texas as soon as it could be done " consistently with the 
treaty stipulations of this government ". On the fifteenth Adams 
moved to recommit the report with instructions to bring in a resolu- 
tion containing the declaration " That any attempt by act of con- 
gress or by treaty to annex the republic of Texas to this union would 
be a usurpation of power, unlawful and void, and which it would be 
the right and the duty of the free people of the union to resist and 
annul ". On the sixteenth he took the floor in support of his motion 
and consumed the morning hour from then till July 7, the last work- 
ing-day of the session but one. This made any action on the matter, 
and any answer to his argument, meanwhile alike impossible.^ 

By this time the ardor of Texas itself was abating. President 
Houston instructed Anson Jones, who took the place of Hunt as min- 
ister to the United States in the summer of 1838, formally to with- 

1 Niks' Register, LIV, 256, 332, passim. 



Movement for the Annexation of Texas 96 

draw the proposal for annexation, and this was done October 12.* 
At the end of the year the presidency of Texas passed from Houston 
to Lamar, who was strongly opposed to annexation, and who so ex- 
pressed himself in his first message to the Texan congress. A joint 
resolution of that body, approved January 23, 1839,^ ratified the 
withdrawal of the proposition. The people of Texas gave consent 
by silence, and the first stage of the movement was over. 

George P. Garrison. 

1 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 947. 

2 La7vs of the Republic of Texas, passed the First Session of Third Congress, iSjg 
(Houston, 1839), 75. 



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